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Cross-country comparisonsThe Nordic model relies on high tax rates to ﬁnance an extensive welfare state. If labour supply elasticities are
large, the burden of ﬁnancing the model can be large even if, arguably, the practice of providing subsidised
goods that support labour supply is likely to mitigate these effects. We utilise repeated cross sections of micro
data from several countries, including the four major Nordic countries, available from the Luxembourg Income
Study, LIS, to estimate labour supply elasticities, both at the intensive and extensive margins. The data span
over four decades and include a large number of tax reform episodes, with tax rate variation arising both from
cross-sectional and country-level differences. Using these data, we investigate whether micro and macro esti-
mates differ in a systematic way. The results do not provide strong support for the view that elasticities at the
macro level would be higher than the corresponding micro elasticities.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The size of the public sector in the Nordic countries is among the
largest in the world. Since tax distortions may rise with the tax rate,
the burden of ﬁnancing the public sector can become large. Recentmac-
roeconomic research also suggests that the overall impacts of taxes on
employment at the country level could be much greater than what
has been previously thought based on microeconometric evidence. If
this were true, the Nordic countries would ﬁnd it increasingly difﬁcult
to sustain their welfare states. In this paper, we examine rigorously
whether the macro labour supply estimates are, in fact, higher than
the micro estimates. While macro point estimates tend to be higher
than ourmicro estimates, our results do not support the view, expressed
in the recentmacro research, thatmacro estimates aremuch larger than
themicro estimates. In addition, themicro-level hours and participation
elasticities with respect to net wages we obtain are modest for the
Nordic countries in our sample. This can be partly due to the Nordic
arrangement of subsidising goods that are important in conjunction
with labour supply, such as childcare, which may counteract some
of the harmful effects of taxation on work effort and employmentjukka.pirttila@uta.ﬁ (J. Pirttilä),
. This is an open access article under(see, e.g., Olovsson (2009); Ragan (2013); Rogerson (2007)). All this
points to the conclusion that high tax rates do not necessarily seriously
endanger the high effort and employment rates that are important for
the functioning of the welfare state.
An inﬂuential study within the macro tradition is Prescott (2004),
who suggests that tax differences explain virtually all the differences
in working hours between the U.S. and Europe. Large elasticities are
also needed for conventionalmacromodels tomatch the empirical ﬂuc-
tuations in aggregate employment over business cycles. Sometimes
macro studies are based on simple cross-country comparisons and
they do not typically pay attention to endogeneity issues, such as the
possibility that if the economy performs badly and unemployment
rises, countries need to raise taxes to balance budgets. And they often
omit other potential explanatory variables that could affect
employment.1
There is, however, a large discrepancy between this macroeconomic
work and much of the modern microeconometric evidence on the im-
pact of taxation on labour supply and taxable income. The micro evi-
dence is nowadays based on careful examination of how individuals1 Nickell (2003) concludes that, when other potential explanations for employment be-
haviour, such as differences in wage setting frameworks and social security systems, are
accounted for, a 10% difference in taxes on labour income reduces overall labour input pro-
vided via the market by 2% of the population of working age.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
2 Piketty et al. (2014) estimate top income elasticities using macro data.
3 We follow Chetty et al. (2012) and refer to macro elasticities if the source of the tax
variation used in explaining labour supply is cross-country comparisons;micro elasticities
refer to ﬁndings identiﬁed from cross-sectional variation within a country.
4 We also compare our macro estimates to the standard ways, used earlier in the liter-
ature, to estimate country-level responses to taxation.
5 Thewell-known revenue-maximising topmarginal tax rate for Pareto-distributed top
incomes is given by the formula 1/(1+ a× e) where a is the Pareto–Lorenz coefﬁcient and
e is the elasticity of taxable income.With a typical Nordic value of a equal to approximately
2, themarginal tax rate on top incomes should not exceed 20% if the elasticity is as high as
2, which belongs to the interval recommended by Keane and Rogerson (2012). The top
marginal tax rate (including commodity taxes) in Sweden is currently around 70%
(Pirttilä and Selin, 2011). These differences dramatically highlight the issues at stake.
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tify the causal effects of tax changes on taxpayer behaviour. It is
summarised by Meghir and Phillips (2010) in their chapter for the au-
thoritative treatment of tax research in the Mirrlees Review. They con-
clude that, while labour market participation decisions can be quite
elastic with respect to the take-home pay when working versus when
unemployed (the ‘extensive margin’), the working hours of those who
already work (the ‘intensive margin’) are typically quite unresponsive
to tax rates. While taxable income estimates are typically higher than
estimates of working hour responses (for a recent survey, see Saez
et al. (2012)) even taxable income responses are typically modest;
typical estimates of taxable income elasticities with respect to the net-
of-tax rate (=1-marginal tax rate) are around 0.2–0.5.
But it is not clear either that the micro estimates provide the correct
estimates of the long-run effects of taxes on labour supply behaviour.
There are now several recent papers that aim to explain why micro
and macro estimates differ so signiﬁcantly. Chetty (2012) provides a
possible solution building on optimization frictions. While micro evi-
dencehas paid a lot of attention to carefully estimating the causal effects
of speciﬁc tax changes, these tax changes are often too small to generate
really large society-wide impacts. If there are frictions related to re-
optimisation of labour supply and income generation, it may not be
worthwhile for individuals to react to small tax changes. Then estimates
based onmicro data can be downwards biased. Tax differences between
countries, by contrast, are often so large that, at least in the long run, the
economy and the individuals have reacted to those optimally. In Chetty
et al. (2011a), the authors demonstrate that if taxation of households
creates economy-wide structures, employers are likely to cater to
employees' desires by offering compensation packages that suit thema-
jority of the workforce. They also provide evidence from Denmark,
where many taxpayers (and in particular in occupations where
compensation packages can be tailored well) bunch at income levels
where they just avoid paying an increased state-level marginal tax
rate. Chetty et al. (2011a) also show how smaller tax changes, which
do not affect all tax payers, generate much smaller behavioural elastici-
ties than a single large increase in the marginal tax rate at the country
level.
A second explanation is related to indivisible labour and varying re-
sponses along the intensive and extensive margins. A key paper in this
strand of research is Rogerson andWallenius (2009), which introduces
the extensive margin to an otherwise standard macro model and dem-
onstrate how the presence of ﬁxed costs generates a realistic life-cycle
proﬁle of labour supply. While taxation might not matter so much for
the hour choice of the working-age population, it can have a sizeable
impact on the length of working life, so that at the aggregate level
hours become quite responsive to tax changes.
A third explanation, building on Imai and Keane (2004), relies on the
way human capital formation interacts with taxation. In a learning-by-
doing framework, taxation can have signiﬁcant long-run consequences,
because if it leads to lower working hours in a current period, it also de-
presses wages in later periods. Therefore the cumulative distortionary
effect of taxation, whichmatters at a macro level, could be much higher
than what a typical static micro estimate would suggest.
The differences between micro and macro elasticities can also be
linked to the work on social norms and the welfare state of Lindbeck
et al. (1999). If individuals suffer from a stigmawhen living off beneﬁts
and this stigma is decreasing in the share of the population on beneﬁts,
it is conceivable that tax increases ﬁrst reduce one's work effort margin-
ally. However, gradually that has an externality on others via the social
norm and in the end the overall, macro, effect is greater than the initially
measured micro response.
Finally, even if the majority of micro-level labour supply studies
would imply fairly small elasticities at the intensive margin, some of
the elasticity of taxable income studies, surveyed recently by Saez
et al. (2012), ﬁndmuch larger elasticities, especially at the top of the in-
come distribution. However, these elasticities capture effects such asincome shifting behaviour and cannot be directly used to predict
cross-country differences in employment.2
Despite this emerging research, the issue is far from settled. This is
reﬂected in the conclusions in two recent surveys on the topic by lead-
ing researchers in the ﬁeld. Chetty et al. (2012) conclude that
“Based on our reading of the micro evidence, we recommend cali-
bratingmacro models to match Hicksian elasticities of 0.3 on the in-
tensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin,”
which would lead to a combined macro elasticity of approximately 0.5.
By contrast, Keane and Rogerson (2012) argue that
“In our view, the literature we have described can credibly support a
view that compensated and intertemporal elasticities at the macro
level fall in the range of 1 to 2 that is typically assumed in macro
general equilibrium models.”
Since reliable evidence on the impacts of tax changes on working
hours is one of the most important pieces of knowledge that eco-
nomic policymakers need, there is an urgent need for further re-
search that could help us understand the differences between these
recommendations.
The purpose of this paper is to shed new light on this micro–macro
controversy by estimating labour supply elasticities using micro-level
data from several industrialised countries. Building on high-quality,
harmonised, and comparable data from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS), we employ the repeated cross-section estimation method
developed by Blundell et al. (1998) to estimate the elasticity of working
hours and participation at the micro level, macro level and at an inter-
mediate level with the tax variation arising from both cross-sectional
and cross-country sources.
The value-added of the paper is the following. First, the data span
over several decades and countries and contain a large number of tax re-
form episodes, including major tax reforms, which means that there is
good scope for reliable estimation. Additionally, tax changes have
taken place across the whole income distribution, not only among top
income earners. Second, we use the same estimator and harmonised
data to estimate micro and macro elasticities.3 We can compare if
micro elasticities are in fact smaller than macro elasticities, without dif-
ferences inmethodology confounding the potential differences inmicro
estimates from different countries or differences between micro and
macro level reactions. Third, at the macro level, the model is also cor-
rectly speciﬁed (from the point of view of a static labour supply
model), since we actually use mean marginal tax rates and virtual in-
comes from the data, rather than artiﬁcial constructs or average tax
rates. In addition, the marginal tax rate we use also includes (in our
main speciﬁcations) not only the increase in tax liability but also reduc-
tions in transfers and beneﬁts; that is, we use the theoretically correct
effective marginal tax rates.4 And fourth, we provide separate analyses
of the intensive and extensive margins, estimated both at the micro
and macro levels.
The topic is of key importance to the Nordic model – the public sec-
tors in theNordic countries are among the largest in theworld and since
tax distortions, other things equal, rise with the tax rate, the burden of
ﬁnancing the public sector could be very large.5 But as we already
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used in conjunction with labour supply, such as childcare, likely coun-
teracts some of the harmful effect of taxation on work effort, as pointed
out e.g. by Rogerson (2007), and Blomquist et al. (2010). Indeed, such
institutional differences across countries are an important reason to ex-
plore the importance of taxation for labour supply both within and
across countries. Taxes, after all, ﬁnance goods and services that are val-
ued, so if their negative effects can be mitigated by clever design, such
information is valuable. While we do not address the issue of why esti-
mated elasticities vary across countries, providing estimates across
many countries using the same data and methods does open for what
we believe could be a fruitful direction for research.
Needless to say, the study also has some limitations. We cannot
cover all OECD countries, since for some of the countries, suitable data
are not available from LIS. We control for education level in the estima-
tions, and therefore the impact of taxes which we measure do not con-
tain the potential that tax changes can lead to changes in educational
attainment. Unlike country-level studies, we do not have access to a
microsimulation model to calculate effective marginal tax rates and
we use data-driven semi-parametric methods to estimate marginal
tax rates. However, this is also a methodological novelty, and we com-
pare the estimated tax rates to other available information on tax sys-
tems in these countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides amore detailed re-
view of the existing papers on the micro–macro differences in elasticity
estimates. Section 3 presents the theoretical background and empirical
methodology, while Section 4 covers the data description and marginal
tax rate estimation. The estimation results are presented in Section 5,
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
This section surveys the emerging literature on themicro–macro dif-
ferences in labour supply/earnings elasticities to understandwhat is the
current status and whether important knowledge gaps remain. Notice
that our aim is not to cover conventional microeconomic estimates on
labour supply or taxable income; for surveys on these, see Meghir and
Phillips (2010) and Saez et al. (2012).
2.1. Starting point
One of the starting points for this literature is the work by Prescott
(2002, 2004). Prescott (2004) studies seven countries, namely
Germany, France, Italy, Canada, the U.K., Japan, and the U.S. (the G-7
countries), over two time periods, 1970–74 and 1993–96. The analysis
contains 14 observations. Prescott sets up a standard growth model
with a representative household and a representative ﬁrm, and he
parameterises the value of leisure in such a way that the average labour
supply themodel generatesmatches the actual values in the data. Given
this choice of preference parameter, he obtains predicted work hours
fairly close to actual work hours in 12 out of 14 cases. He obtains a la-
bour supply elasticity of “nearly 3 when the fraction of time allocated
to the market is in the neighbourhood of the current U.S. level”.
Obviously, ‘nearly 3’ sounds like a very large elasticity. This is, how-
ever, a Frisch elasticity.6 Permanent differences in working hours be-
tween countries are more closely related to static labour supply
elasticities. Alesina et al. (2005) show that Prescott's choice of parame-
ter values implies an uncompensated (Marshallian) labour supply elas-
ticity of 0.77. As we demonstrate in online Appendix C, the same
parameter values imply a compensated (Hicksian) elasticity of 1.39. In
fact, Prescott's functional form assumptions and choice of parameter
values also imply sizeable income effects on labour supply. Against6 The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is derived holding marginal utility of consump-
tion constant, whereas Hicksian estimates typically used by public ﬁnance economists
are derived holding utility constant.this background, it is an interesting feature of our study that we also es-
timate the response to changes in unearned income.
Relatedly, Chetty et al. (2011b) plot Prescott's data and ﬁt a regres-
sion line to it. They then estimate a ‘Hicksian’ labour supply elasticity
of 0.7 on the 14 observations. They interpret this as a Hicksian elasticity
as Prescott had assumed that the tax proceeds are handed back as lump-
sumpayments. Note that the estimate byChetty et al. is only a half of the
estimate implied by Prescott's work. In our paper, which builds on
microeconometric techniques, we can directly model unearned income
and do not need to assume anything regarding the extent to which tax
revenues are paid back.
Prescott's paper has given rise to a large debate. The basic conclu-
sionswere broadly supported by Ohanian et al. (2008), who used a sim-
ilar methodology. Other researchers, such as Nickell (2003) and Alesina
et al. (2005), have pointed at the difﬁculties of teasing apart the impact
of taxes from other factors that also affect aggregate work hours in a
country. In addition, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) point out that the conclu-
sions in Prescott (2002) change if one also considers that workers typi-
cally receive unemployment beneﬁts (as a certain fraction of their work
income) when unemployed.
2.2. Related papers
Blundell et al. (2013) describe the long-run evolution ofmean annu-
al hours per worker, the employment rate, and the unconditional mean
hours per individual using Labour Force Survey data from the U.S., the
U.K. and France. Of particular interest is that total hours in the U.K.
have decreased over a forty-year period, despite the fact that the U.K.
has adopted similar tax policy reforms as theU.S. (e.g. in-work tax credit
policies). Blundell et al. ﬁnd that neither the intensive nor the extensive
margin dominates in explaining the changes in total hours worked. The
relative importance of the two margins differs across age, gender and
family composition groups.
Davies and Henrekson (2004) exploit aggregate data for nineteen
countries on outcome variables such as the ratio of employment to pop-
ulation of working age, annual hours worked per employed person, and
annual hours worked per adult of working age. According to their re-
sults, average tax rates are strongly negatively associated with working
hours and employment rates in an OLS regression, but the coefﬁcient
becomes insigniﬁcant when country ﬁxed effects are included.
The study by Piketty et al. (2014), while not so much related to the
literature on micro–macro elasticities, is of interest here as it uses
macro data to estimate taxable income elasticities at the top. They ex-
ploit the World Top Income Database combined with top income tax
rate data starting in 1975. Piketty et al.ﬁnd a strong correlation between
the growth in top incomes andmarginal tax cuts for top income earners.
Higher top incomes did not, however, lead to higher GDP growth.
An alternative explanation to why hours have increased in the U.S.
and fallen in Europe is related to behavioural economics, namely the
Veblen effect: When people compare their income level to that of top
earners, a rise in income inequality can render people to supplymore la-
bour because of their effort to “keep up with the Joneses”. Oh et al.
(2012) use country-level data on working hours, taxes and top income
shares and show, in amodelwith country and yearﬁxed effects, how in-
creases in top income shares are associated with increases in working
hours. Moreover, taxes lose explanatory power for working hours
when the top income share is added to the regression model.
Theﬁnal paper that is relevant to the current paper, and perhaps also
the closest one, is Bargain et al. (2014). They have collected microdata
on work hours, wages, and taxes and beneﬁts from 17 European coun-
tries and the U.S. and combine these with microsimulation models.
For the European countries, they use the EUROMOD microsimulation
model and they use TAXSIM for the U.S. The motivation for the paper
is to make a large-scale international comparison of elasticities, while
netting out possible differences due to methods, data selection, and
the period of investigation. To this end, they estimate the same
Table 1




Canada 1981, 1987(h), 1991(h), 1994(h), 1997(h), 1998(h), 2000(h),
2004(h)
Czech Republic 1996, 2004
Denmark 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2004
Finland 1987, 1991(h), 1995, 2000, 2004
Germany 1984, 1989(h), 1994(h), 2000(h), 2004(h)
Israel 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005
Netherlands 1987, 1999(h), 2004(h)
Norway 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004
Sweden 1992(h), 1995(h), 2000, 2005
United Kingdom 1991(h), 1995(h), 1999, 2004
United States 1974(h), 1986(h), 1991(h), 1994(h), 1997(h), 2000(h), 2004(h)
Note: (h) indicates availability of data on annual work hours.
10 The gross hourly wage rate is obtained by dividing annual earnings by annual work
hours.
11 Thismeans that we exclude households that include adults who are not in the nuclear
family.
12 It is common in the empirical tax literature to impose a lower income limit on the es-
timation sample, see e.g. Gruber and Saez (2002).
13 Unfortunately, we lack data on consumption and/orwealth formost countries. Hence,
unlike Blundell et al. (1998) we cannot estimate models with dynamic interpretations.
14 Our measure of taxes does not include social security payments. One reason for this
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with separate models for couples and singles. The wage elasticities
vary less between the countries than previously thought. The resulting
differences are interpreted as consequences of heterogeneous
preferences.
Since our paper ismore related to themicro–macro differences, their
study and our work are quite complementary. There are also many
signiﬁcant differences in the approaches taken. For example, we use
the Blundell et al. repeated cross-section estimator, whereas they
build a discrete choice labour supply model that relies on cross-
sectional variation for identiﬁcation and we utilise data over a much
longer time span.
3. Data
3.1. General features and sample selection
Our data are from the Luxembourg Income Study database, LIS,
which collects household- and individual-level data on household
income, taxes paid and transfers received, working hours (for a subset
of countries) and consumption (Luxembourg Income Study Database
(LIS), 2014). The beneﬁt of the data is that LIS has invested a large
amount of work to make the data comparable across countries and
across years. LIS provides income, labour market, and demographic
data that have been harmonised into a common template, so the con-
tents of the variables are as comparable as cross-country data, across
time, can get.7
Another beneﬁt of the data is that it spans over four decades; the
data we use start from the beginning of the 1970s. It also covers a
wide range of different type of countries; we focus on developed
(OECD) countries. Not all information is available for all countries,
however. A main dividing line is between ‘gross’ and ‘net’ data sets.
Gross data sets record all market and non-market income sources
gross of income taxes, whereas net data, as the name suggests, include
only information on income sources net of taxes withheld. We can, of
course, use only those countries that provide gross data, in LIS parlance.
In addition, even if household-level data exist, individual-level earnings
data are not always available. These restrictions limit the number of
countries we cover to 13. These include, most notably, key Anglophone
countries (the U.S., the U.K., Australia), the Scandinavian countries,
and some Central European countries (such as Germany and
Netherlands).8 The countries in our data are interestingly different in
their institutional characteristics and the role and size of the govern-
ment in the economy.
As mentioned in the introduction, the data are repeated cross sec-
tions from a number of waves. The exact year corresponding to a partic-
ular wave varies somewhat across countries. Table 1 lists the countries
and years in our data.
We have two key dependent variables in our empirical analyses: an-
nual work hours and labour force participation. The variable for annual
work hours is created from survey questions onweekly hours and num-
ber of weeks worked per year. We can use information on work hours
for seven countries: Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden,
the U.K. and the U.S.9
The earnings variable, which is available for all 13 countries,
includes both monetary and non-monetary compensation. For a
majority of countries, the earnings variable comes from surveys, but
for some countries, especially the Nordic ones, it is based on register
data. The earnings variable is used both in the intensive and in the7 For information on data harmonisation, see http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/our-lis-documentation-harmonisation-guidelines.pdf.
8 Prior to 1990 West Germany was a LIS country. For the post-1990 samples for re-
uniﬁed Germany, we excluded the formerly East German Länder.
9 We also have hour data for Finland in 1991 and Belgium in 1997. However, as the es-
timation framework builds on changes in taxes across time and groups we leave Finland
and Belgium out from the hour regressions.extensive margin analyses. In the extensive margin analyses, we use
earnings in calculating the net gain from employment. In the intensive
margin analysis, the earnings variable is used to construct the gross
wage.10
We have limited our analysis to four types of households, single per-
sons (with and without children) and couples (again, with and without
children), to be able to more cleanly estimate how taxes and transfers
vary with income.11 The estimation samples for the intensive margin
analysis (work hours and earnings) and the extensive margin analysis
are selected in slightly different ways. We impose the following
restrictions on the ‘intensivemargin sample’. First, we only include indi-
viduals aged 25–54, so that early retirement is not an issue. Second, we
exclude individuals who earn less than the 20th percentile, where per-
centiles are deﬁned based on the distribution of earnings in country c in
period t.12 Due to variations in top-coding of the LIS data, we also ex-
clude those with earnings exceeding the 97.5 percentile in country c
in period t.
In the extensivemargin analysis, we include all individuals aged 25–
64 in the sample. In the extensive margin analysis, it is in fact desirable
to also capture the retirement margin (as emphasised by Rogerson and
Wallenius (2009)).
The model below in Section 4 lays out in more detail the require-
ments of the empirical model. In terms of data, we also need informa-
tion on capital income.13 Demographic variables (sex, education, age,
household type) are also used.3.2. Tax variables
A key variable in the intensive margin analysis is the effective
marginal tax rate.14 The slope of an individual's budget constraint is
not only determined by the statutory income tax schedule, but also by
the transfer systems in place. To our knowledge, there is nochoice is that while the data has household or individual level information on the social
security payments made by the employees, the social security payments paid by the em-
ployerswould need to be imputed. Countries also differ signiﬁcantly in the division of the-
se payments between employees and employers, and this division should not really
matter for tax incidence. For equal treatment of countries, we decided not to take these
payments into account. For macro regressions, we also calculate alternative tax functions
that take into account proportional consumption taxes. The rates of these vary only at the
country level.
16 The virtual income consists of the individual's non-labour income and a term that
takes into account that inframarginal units of supplied income is taxed at other rates (typ-
ically lower rates) than income supplied at the margin. Formally, for a general nonlinear
tax system T(z), virtual income at a point x is deﬁned as the intersection between the tan-
gent (i.e. linear approximation) of the budget set c(z)= z− T(z) at x and the consumption
axis.
17 The compensated labour supply elasticity, which is the relevant parameter for dead-
weight loss calculations, can be obtained through the Slutsky relationship.
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tax rates for all the countries in all the years in our data. We therefore
proceed in the followingway. For the purpose of calculating the statuto-
ry income tax schedules, we build a small tax calculator. For a majority
of countries, we exploit information on segment limits and rates
(for both central government and subcentral government taxation) pro-
vided by theOECD from1981 and onwards.15 TheOECD information ap-
plies to singles without dependents. For countries and time periods
where the OECD information is missing or insufﬁcient, we have collect-
ed information from alternative sources, e.g. from the library of the In-
ternational Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) in Amsterdam and
the European Tax Handbooks, various editions. The coded tax functions
are then used to computemarginal tax rates, taking into account differ-
ences between joint vs. individual taxation and global vs. dual income
taxation.
Needless to say, the tax rates calculated in this way are not ideal
measures of the individuals' marginal incentives to earn income. A lim-
itation of our data is that information on deductions is absent. As men-
tioned above, we do not observe taxable income net of deductions,
which is the relevant base for income taxation. As a consequence,
given that marginal tax rates typically are increasing in income, we be-
lieve that the true level of statutory marginal tax rates facing taxpayers
is lower than the one we have calculated.
It is considerably more challenging to collect information on the
transfer systems for all countries/years. For the purpose of calculating
themarginal effects arising from the transfer systems, we therefore sug-
gest a data-driven approach, where we ﬁt a non-parametric regression
on labour income to predict marginal effects. We use the locﬁt package
in R to carry out these regressions (for information on these estimation
techniques, see Chapter 6.1 in Loader (1999)). The procedure estimates
local polynomial regressions, regressing taxes on income; the estimated
ﬁrst derivative then represents themarginal rate of transfer withdrawal
as earnings increase. The benchmark regressions use a third degree
polynomial, a nearest-neighbour bandwidth of 0.7 (that is, 70% of obser-
vations are used at every evaluation point) and a Gaussian weighting
function. We also experimented with alternative bandwidths and poly-
nomial degrees.
Taxes and transfers are calculated/estimated separately for four dif-
ferent household types, namely couples and singles with and without
children (see the online Appendix A for a further discussion).
Fig. 1 depicts an example ofmarginal tax rates and effectivemarginal
tax rates used in the analysis. Note that the shape of these two functions
are completely different: marginal tax rates are monotonically increas-
ing, whereas it is well known that effective marginal tax rates take a
U-shaped form: they are highest at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion because of tapering off of beneﬁts. This means that the real incen-
tives, taking into account transfer systems, can be completely different
to many individuals than a typical analysis, using solely statutory
taxes, would suggest.
For the extensive margin analysis, we are interested in participation
tax rates rather than marginal tax rates. These are obtained by using
cell-level estimates of net taxes (taxes less transfers) for those who
work and those who do not but have otherwise similar characteristics;
the difference is taken to measure the change in net taxes on becoming




As mentioned above, our aim is to utilise micro data from several
countries and several time periods to estimate both ‘micro’ and15 This information is available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxpolicyanalysis/
oecdtaxdatabase.htm#pir.‘macro’ elasticities using the same data source. Following Chetty et al.
(2011b), we use the terms ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ elasticities to refer to
the sources of variation used to estimate the elasticities. When the
elasticity is identiﬁed based on quasi-experimental variation between
different groups in a single country, we refer to the estimated elasticity
as a ‘micro’ elasticity. When the elasticity is identiﬁed by cross-country
and time variation, the estimated elasticity is a ‘macro’ elasticity.
In this section, we elaborate on how to estimatemicro elasticities for a
single country. We start from the standard static labour supply model,
where individuals maximise the utility function U= U(c, h) with respect
to consumption, c, and labour supply in terms of annual hours, h,
subject to the linearised budget constraint c= (1− τ)wh+ R, where w
is the gross hourly wage rate, τ is themarginal tax rate and R is virtual in-
come. Virtual income can be computed as R=m+ τz− T(z), wherem
is non-labour income (e.g. the income of the spouse and capital in-
come), z = wh, and T(z) is the income tax function.16 Due to data
limitations, we cannot construct non-labour income variables that are
consistent with two-stage budgeting. The hourly wage rate has been
obtained by dividing annual earnings by annual hours. In accordance
with e.g. Blundell et al. (1998), we assume the following labour supply
function;
hit ¼ βln 1−τitð Þwit þ γRit þ εit ; ð1Þ
where i is an individual index and t is a time index. The uncompen-
sated labour supply elasticity in country c (evaluated at mean hours
in country c) is given by β=h, where h is mean hours in country c.17
The equation is estimated on all i who supply positive hours.
Suppose that we were to estimate Eq. (1) by OLS. As both of the
right-hand side regressors are correlatedwith ε and so are endogenous,
estimates of both of the parameters are biased. Themost obvious reason
is that both τ and R are direct functions of z=wh. An additional reason
is that unobserved variables (e.g., tastes for work and savings)might af-
fect work hours h, the gross wage ratew and the level of non-labour in-
comem simultaneously.
The repeated cross-section element of our data allows us to compare
groups of individuals over time and, thereby, address these endogeneity
issues by constructing instruments. Following Blundell et al. (1998), we
partition the sample into group cells based on country, gender, age and
education level. The key idea behind the grouping procedure is to com-
pare otherwise similar groups of individuals who have been affected
differently by tax reforms (the difference-in-difference setting), while
retaining the ambition to estimate structurally meaningful parameters
(in this case β and γ).18
Let g denote group cell. Suppose that εit = αg + μt + ηit,
where E[ηit|hit N 0, g, t] = 0. According to this assumption, unob-
served heterogeneity, conditional on g and t, can be captured by a per-
manent group effect αg and a time ﬁxed effect μt. This assumption can
also be modiﬁed in such a way that it allows e.g. for education-group-
speciﬁc linear time trends. Let ωgt be a vector that contains the full set
of interactions between group and time. By assumption, these are uncor-
related with ηit. This is the central exclusion restriction for identiﬁcation.
We can then estimate
hit ¼ βln 1−τitð Þwit þ γRit þαg þ μ t þ ηit ð2Þ18 Needless to say, it is not entirely unrestrictive to assume that β and γ are homoge-
neous across demographic groups. It is therefore important to note that we also estimate
our models for males and females separately.
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Fig. 1.Marginal and effective marginal tax rates, Finland and Sweden 1995–2004.
92 M. Jäntti et al. / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 87–99by two-stage least squares (2SLS) while using ωgt as excluded instru-
ments for ln(1− τit)w and Rit. Crucially, both the order condition and
the rank condition for identiﬁcation need to hold. The order condition re-
quires us to have at least as many instruments as endogenous regressors(in our case, two). The rank condition requires that net wage rates and
virtual incomes must both change at different rates for different groups
over time. As the variation in the second-stage equation is entirely at
the group level, Eq. (2) can also be estimated by collapsing the data into
93M. Jäntti et al. / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 87–99time-speciﬁc groupaverages of the relevant variables.19We thenestimate
the parameters from
hgt ¼ βmicroln 1−τgt
 
wgt þ γmicroRgt þαg þ μ t þ ηgt ð3Þ
by GLS, using group size as weights. Using either Eqs. (2) or (3) yields
identical results.
One should recognise that tax reforms are not the sole source of
identifying variation when estimating Eq. (3). Identiﬁcation also
comes from differential growth in gross hourly wage rates.20
4.2. Macro elasticities
We will now highlight the country-time dimension of our data.
Eq. (2) can also be estimated by 2SLS using the interactions between
the country dummies and time dummies as excluded instruments. Let
c be a country index and let αc be a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect. The
macro elasticity can be estimated by collapsing the data into year-
speciﬁc country averages and estimating the parameters from
hct ¼ βmacroln 1−τctð Þwct þ γmacroRct þ αc þ μ t þ ηct : ð4Þ
Since it is common in the macro literature not to weigh by country
size, we estimate 4 by OLS rather than GLS as a baseline. Thus, we let
the weights within each country sum to one. The results from those re-
gressions can be readily compared with earlier macro-level regressions.
4.3. Micro–macro estimates
A third alternative, which can be characterised as a bridge between
micro and macro estimation, is to use micro data for several countries
in the same regression. While retaining the above notation, we write
the regression equation as
hgct ¼ βmicromacroln 1−τgct
 
wgct þ γmicromacroRgct þ αcg þ μt þ ηgct ; ð5Þ
whichwe estimate by GLS. To achieve comparability with themacro re-
gressions, we normalise theweights in such away that they sum to 1 for
country c in year t. The elasticity is now identiﬁed by variation both be-
tween groups (deﬁned by sex, age and education) and between
countries.
One can add additional controls, such as country-speciﬁc trends to
this equation. In this case, the equation above is rewritten as εit =
αg + μt + δc × trend+ ηit. In words, unobserved heterogeneity, condi-
tional on g and t, can be captured by a permanent group effectαg, a time
ﬁxed effect μt and a country-speciﬁc linear time trend, δc × trend.
Education-speciﬁc trends can be added in similar spirit.
The practical complication that arises in the estimations is that we
need to take into account spousal income in the regressions, and coun-
tries have different solutions to family taxation (joint vs individual tax-
ation). Also, capital income is treated in different ways (comprehensive
vs. dual income taxation). In online Appendix A, we describe the way
budget constraints, including virtual income, are calculated for these
different cases.19 See Angrist and Pischke (2008, section 4.1.3.) for an interesting discussion about IV es-
timation on grouped data.
20 It is important for the interpretation of the estimated parameters whether or not the
tax andwage changes used for identiﬁcation are anticipated by the agents. Here wemake
the standard assumption that the tax and wage changes are unanticipated. Typically, the
time difference between two waves in a given country is several years (see Table 1).
Therefore, we believe that this is a reasonable assumption.4.4. The extensive margin
The analysis above was limited to the reaction at the intensive mar-
gin (for those who supply a positive amount of hours). We now model
separately the individual's decision whether or not to work. In the ex-
tensive margin model, each individual chooses between two points in
the consumption-earnings space. They choose between consumption
at zero earnings and at the earnings level they potentially would earn
if they entered the labour market.
Following e.g. Immervoll et al. (2007), suppose the utility when
working takes a quasi-linear form U= c− v(z), where v(z), v(0) = 0,
reﬂects the disutility of earnings supply.21 Let the subscripts w and nw
denote consumption and earnings in the state of work and non-work,
respectively. The utility fromnotworking is just cnw. Therefore, the indi-
vidual works if cw− cnw N v(zw). Consumption when working is given
by cw = zw − T(zw) + q, where T(z) denotes transfers received and
taxes paid, and q other household income. Consumption when not
working is cnw =− T(0) + q. The condition for working can therefore
be written in terms of tax variables as
zw− T zwð Þ−T 0ð Þ½ −v zwð ÞN0; ð6Þ
which can also be written as
1−að Þzw−v zwð ÞN0; ð7Þ
where a = [T(zw) − T(0)]/zw is the participation tax rate, i.e. the in-
crease in taxes and the loss in beneﬁts, relative to gross earnings,
when the individual starts to earn positive labour income. For linear
probability models, the empirical counterpart of Eq. (7), the probability
to work P(work)i,t for the individual i and at period t is22
P workð Þit ¼ αþ βext 1−aitð Þzw;it þ εit; ð8Þ
where P(work) is deﬁned to take on the value of 1 if the individual is in
paid employment. The participation elasticity, i.e. the percentage
change in the probability to work from a percentage change in 1− a,
can be calculated as βext [(1 − a)z/P(work)]. In similarity with the
hours regressions, identiﬁcation of β does not only rely on the tax vari-
able a, but also on imputed potential earnings in the state of work.
Similarly to the intensive margin case, we assume that the error
term takes the form εit = αg + μt + ηit, where E[ηit] = 0. Eq. (8)
could be estimated by 2SLS using the interaction between the group
and time dummies as instruments for (1− ait)zw,it. Equivalently, one
can estimate the group-averaged equation.
P workð Þgt ¼ βext 1−agt
 
zgt þαg þ μt þ ηgt ð9Þ
byGLS. As in the intensivemargin case, the analysis can also be conduct-
ed at the macro level, aggregating Eq. (9) to the country level.
There are two main challenges involved in estimating the ﬁnancial
gain of working, (1− ait)zw,it: imputing earnings in the state of work
and estimating the tax and transfer function. In online Appendix B, we
elaborate more on how we do this.21 v(z) can be interpreted broadly to also accommodate ﬁxed costs of working. To ease
notation we leave the term capturing the ﬁxed costs out.
22 Formally, this derivation assumes that v(z) is uniformly distributed. It would perhaps
have been more realistic to assume a normal distribution and, hence, arrive at a probit
model. Thiswould not, however, have been tractable froma statistical point of viewowing
to the incidental parameter problem.
Table 2
Countrywise hour regression results.
A. All B. Men C. Women
Australia
Net wage elasticity 0.011 0.383 −0.282
(0.149) (0.377) (0.146)
Virtual income elasticity −0.080 0.146 −0.190*
(0.095) (0.174) (0.077)
Nr of cells 32 17 15
Canada
Net wage elasticity 0.381*** 0.506*** 0.189*
(0.048) (0.056) (0.074)
Virtual income elasticity −0.135 −0.283 −0.038
(0.077) (0.154) (0.081)
Nr of cells 126 63 63
Germany
Net wage elasticity 0.105 0.081 0.163
(0.065) (0.099) (0.100)
Virtual income elasticity 0.047 0.070 −0.002
(0.077) (0.133) (0.080)
Nr of cells 70 36 34
Netherlands
Net wage elasticity 0.249*** −0.483 0.043
(0.063) (0.267) (0.246)
Virtual income elasticity 0.115 −0.122 0.074
(0.088) (0.110) (0.850)
Nr of cells 33 18 15
Sweden
Net wage elasticity 0.240 0.288* 0.233
(0.169) (0.134) (0.380)
Virtual income elasticity −0.267 −0.661** −0.105
(0.418) (0.221) (0.617)
Nr of cells 36 18 18
United Kingdom
Net wage elasticity −0.576 −1.657 1.406
(0.975) (1.372) (0.784)
Virtual income elasticity −0.315 0.291 −0.641***
(0.235) (0.854) (0.129)
Nr of cells 35 18 17
United States
Net wage elasticity 0.280*** 0.130* 0.228***
(0.029) (0.057) (0.068)
Virtual income elasticity −0.046 −0.064 −0.044
(0.040) (0.068) (0.049)
Nr of cells 126 63 63
Note: Dependent variable: annual working hours. Cells are deﬁned based on age,
education and sex. Cells with less than 50 observations are excluded. Individuals with
earnings lower than the 20th percentile in each country/year are excluded from the un-
derlying data. The reported estimates are the elasticities of working hours with respect
to (1-effective marginal tax rate)*gross hourly wage and virtual income. All regressions
contain the full set of cell dummies and year dummies. Standard errors reported below
the estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** 5%
level and *** at 1% level.
Source: Authors' estimations.
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5.1. Working hours
The results on working hours are only available for seven countries
for which at least two cross sections of data on hours are available.
The country-speciﬁc estimates for all individuals, as well as men and
women separately, corresponding to Eq. (3), are presented in Table 2.
Various speciﬁcations of the macro level hour estimation results, corre-
sponding to Eq. (4), are presented in Table 3, whereas themicro–macro
estimates of Eq. (5) are in Table 4. Throughout the results section,we re-
port elasticities rather than regression coefﬁcients. For work hours, we
report the (uncompensated) hour elasticity with respect to the net
wage and the hour elasticity with respect to (virtual) non-labour in-
come. Reported standard errors have been obtained by the delta
method.
The results from countrywise regressions indicate that the net wage
elasticities are either insigniﬁcant or positive. The most interesting
cases are perhaps the U.S. and Canada, where we use altogether seven
cross-sections of data (and obtain signiﬁcant net wage elasticities
throughout). For Canada, we estimate an average net wage elasticity
of 0.38. When estimating the same model separately for males and fe-
males, it turns out that the point estimate for the male elasticity
(0.51) is larger than the point estimate for the female elasticity (0.19).
For the U.S., we estimate an overall elasticity of 0.28. However, for the
U.S., the female elasticity (0.23) is estimated to be larger than the
male elasticity (0.13).23 It is a common reading of the labour supply lit-
erature that female elasticities are larger than male elasticities.
For other countries, the net wage elasticities are insigniﬁcant. In
general, virtual income elasticities are insigniﬁcant as well. However,
in those cases where the estimate is indeed signiﬁcant (women in
Australia, males in Sweden and women in the U.K.) it takes on the ex-
pected negative sign, consistentwith thewidespread notion that leisure
is a normal good.
Let us now turn to the macro regressions for hours reported in
Table 3. These regressions contain 26 observations that are aggregates
of the cells used in the micro regressions.24 In column 1, we report a
net wage elasticity of around 0.2 from a regression where we only in-
clude the log net wage and virtual income. In the key speciﬁcation
that includes both country and year dummies (column 4), the net
wage elasticity is estimated to be as large as 0.64 and the estimate is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant.
Remember that identiﬁcation comes from the interaction between
country and year. In fact, since countries and years do not fully overlap
(see Table 1), the estimate reported in column 4 can be obtained by
using a subset of 13 observations only.Whenwe use LISwave dummies
instead of year dummies, considerably more observations contribute to
the identifying variation. A LIS wave typically spans 3–5 calendar years.
As can be inferred from column 5, the net wage elasticity drops from
0.64 to 0.37, but it is still very signiﬁcant. It should be emphasised
that the regressions with wave rather than year dummies are more ro-
bust to small changes in the speciﬁcation.25 When we allow for23 From a technical perspective, it is not odd that the overall elasticity for theU.S. exceeds
both themale and female elasticity estimates. The reason is that these estimates are iden-
tiﬁed in different ways. When estimating the overall elasticity, the interaction between
gender status and time contributes to the identifying variation, which is not the true for
the gender-speciﬁc regressions. Still, this phenomenon might indicate that it is problem-
atic to aggregate males and females in this way.
24 In themicro regressions,we exclude cells that contain less than 50observations. These
are, however, includedwhen constructing the aggregatedmacro sample. Results are virtu-
ally identical if one excludes cells with less than 50 observations before aggregating.
25 If one runs the main regression 7 times while omitting one country each time, the re-
sults with wave and country dummies are in the range 0.29 to 0.43. Doing the same exer-
cise with year and country dummies, we get more unstable estimates when leaving out
Canada and theU.S.With year dummies, themainmacrohour estimate rises to 0.72 if con-
sumption taxes are added but it drops to 0.44 if one omits virtual income and to 0.58 if the
net of tax wage is calculated using statutory taxes only. The coefﬁcient even becomes in-
signiﬁcant if one controls for the share of each education level in cells.heterogenous responses for males and females (columns 6 and 7), we
obtain a larger point estimate for males.
In the key speciﬁcation (column 4), the estimated virtual income
elasticity takes on the ‘wrong’ sign and is borderline signiﬁcant. As far
as we know, this is the ﬁrst time the virtual income regressor has
been included in a cross-country regression. Since virtual income con-
tains components such as spousal income and asset income, it is per-
haps not surprising that we get a positive sign when we exploit the
interaction between time and country to recover the virtual income
elasticity. Importantly, the estimated net wage elasticities are through-
out virtually unaffected by dropping the virtual income term from the
macro regression.
In Table 4, we report estimates from the ‘micro–macro’
regressions, where we exploit both cross-country and cell-level
Table 3
Hour macro regressions.
(1) All (2) All (3) All (4) All (5) All (6) Men (7) Women
Net wage elasticity 0.188*** 0.259*** 0.417*** 0.639*** 0.367*** 0.517** 0.465*
(0.031) (0.063) (0.080) (0.173) (0.201) (0.051) (0.244)
Virtual income elasticity −0.200** 0.031 0.021 0.694* 0.358** 0.390 0.388
(0.084) (0.292) (0.116) (0.369) (0.312) (0.085) (0.486)
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Wave dummies No No No No Yes No No
Country dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr of observations 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Note: Dependent variable: average annualworking hours at the country level. Individualswith earnings lower than the 20th percentile in each country/year are excluded from underlying
data. The reported estimates are the elasticities of working hours with respect to (1-effectivemarginal tax rate)*gross hourlywage and virtual income. Standard errors reported below the
estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** at 1% level.
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full set of year dummies and country-cell dummies, the net wage
elasticity is estimated to be around 0.3 and is highly statistically
signiﬁcant. We will refer to this estimate as the ‘micro–macro
elasticity’.26
Whenwe control for the share of a certain household type in the cell
and for education-group-speciﬁc linear time trends, nothing happens to
the estimated net wage elasticity. On the other hand, the virtual income
elasticity increases in the ‘wrong’ direction.27 Across all speciﬁcations,
the net wage estimates are signiﬁcant at the one percent level. In con-
trast to the ‘macro’ regressions, the ‘micro–macro’ regressions are in-
sensitive to controlling for wave dummies instead of year dummies,
see column 5.
In column 4, we report results from a speciﬁcation where we control
for the country-time variation by including interaction terms for coun-
try and year dummies. When only within-country variation is used to
identify the net wage elasticity, it falls to 0.23.28 In similarity with the
macro regressions, we obtain larger net wage elasticities for males
than females, see columns 6 and 7.
The working hour regressions can be summarised in the following
way. The point estimate of the ‘average micro elasticity’ of 0.23 is
lower than the point estimate of the ‘micro–macro elasticity’ of 0.3,
which in turn is lower than the ‘macro elasticity’, where the point
estimates are 0.64 with year dummies and 0.37 with wave dummies.
The difference between the ‘average micro elasticity’ and the macro
elasticity with year dummies appears to be statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero (p-value 0.02, assuming zero correlation)
but that between the ‘average micro elasticity’ and themacro elastic-
ity with wave dummies is not ((p-value 0.51, assuming zero
correlation).295.2. Participation
Results on participation are derived from estimating Eq. (8).
We present those in the form of a participation elasticity, i.e. the
elasticity of the probability to have positive earnings with respect
to an increase in the difference of disposable income when in work
versus when not working. Note that income when not working
contains an average income of the type of person (cell average) in26 In columns 2–7we always control for the interaction between age, education, sex and
country.
27 We have deﬁned four household types: couples with kids, couples without kids, sin-
gles with kids and, ﬁnally, singles without kids.
28 Alternatively, one can of course also control for the interaction between age, educa-
tion, sex and time so that the elasticity is identiﬁed by the country-time interaction only.
In this case, the net wage elasticity is unaltered (0.3), but the virtual income elasticity is
larger.
29 The p-values we report assume a zero correlation, but the statistical signiﬁcance of the
differences is unaffected by allowing the correlation to vary between−1 and 1 in both
cases.question when out of work and it also includes pension income. Thus,
the participation elasticities also capture the retirement margin to
some extent.
The results from Table 5 indicate that the participation elastici-
ties range from 0 to 0.4 for all individuals, with many that are
not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. The size of
the estimates is well in line with the existing estimates in the
literature.30
The macro-level participation elasticity in the ideal speciﬁcation
with the full set of year and country ﬁxed effects, reported in
Table 6, is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. However,
one needs to remember that the number of observations in the
country-level regressions is quite limited (albeit larger than in
many earlier papers); the results therefore need to be interpreted
cautiously. Nevertheless, these results indicate that macro-level par-
ticipation elasticities do not appear to be greater than correspond-
ing elasticities at the micro level, even when taking into account
the retirement margin, affecting the length of the working life. To-
gether with the evidence that macro-level hours estimates could
in fact be somewhat larger than the corresponding micro estimates,
this ﬁnding corroborates the argument in Chetty (2012) and Chetty
et al. (2012) that the difference in macro versus micro estimates
would be greater for the intensive margin than the extensive
margin.
As reported in column 5, we have also estimated the model on the
smaller sample that was used in the hour analysis, where we obtained
a signiﬁcant intensive margin elasticity.
When identiﬁcation arises both from cross-country and cross-
sectional sources (see Table 7), the estimate is statistically signiﬁcant
without any controls or when education-speciﬁc trends are added.
Here we have the expected result that the elasticity is greater for
women than for men. In the basic speciﬁcation with only cell, country
and time ﬁxed effects, the micro–macro estimate (Column 2) is very
close to themean of themicro estimates (Column 5) and it is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Neither is it for the same speciﬁcation for the hour
sample.
Similarly as in the hour regression case, we have also conducted sev-
eral robustness checks. First, we have taken into account also consump-
tion taxes from McDaniel (2012) in the micro–macro and macro
level analysis. Taking into account these taxes in the participation
analysis led to somewhat smaller estimates. Second, we dropped one
country at a time from the micro–macro and macro-level analyses.
Results on participation are insensitive to these changes. Third, instead
of having the net ﬁnancial gain in levels as the key explanatory variable,
we have run all regressions with the log of the net ﬁnancial gain on30 For each country,we have also estimated speciﬁcationswith household typedummies
and education trends added; these alterations did not change the qualitative results ex-
cept in the case of Norway, where the odd negative and signiﬁcant elasticity disappears,
and in the case of Sweden, where the elasticity becomes positive and signiﬁcant.
Table 4
Hour micro–macro regressions.
(1) All (2) All (3) All (4) All (5) All (6) Men (7) Women
Net wage elasticity 0.213*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.233*** 0.312*** 0.318*** 0.216***
(0.008) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.039) (0.041)
Virtual income elasticity −0.239*** 0.025 0.058* −0.011 0.118*** 0.101** 0.079*
(0.015) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.050) (0.046)
Nr of cells 458 458 458 458 458 233 225
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Wave dummies No No No No Yes No No
Cell dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household type No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear education trend No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*country No No No Yes No No No
Note: Dependent variable: annual working hours. Cells are deﬁned based on age, education, sex and country. Cells with less than 50 observations are excluded. Individuals with earnings
lower than the 20th percentile in each country/year are excluded from the underlying data. The reported estimates are the elasticities of working hours with respect to (1-effective
marginal tax rate)*gross hourly wage and virtual income. Standard errors reported below the estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** 5% level
and *** at 1% level.
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similar, but it raises somewhat the point estimates. For example, the
micro–macro elasticity in Column 3 increases from 0.031 to 0.086 and
many other participation elasticities also increase by 5 percentage
points. We believe this is natural as the log speciﬁcation gives a larger
weight to low income earners whose participation elasticity is likely
to be higher.
Finally, we have also used the Blundell et al. (1998) estimator for the
purpose of estimating earnings elasticities in the spirit of Gruber and
Saez (2002) on the same sample. These results were, however, very un-
stable and are not further discussed here.
5.3. Comparison to earlier macro studies
Finally, we compare our macro-level results with typical speciﬁca-
tions used earlier in macro studies on the impacts of taxes on aggregate
working hours. The Prescott (2004) paper was based on simulations,
not on regression analysis. However, Chetty et al. (2011b) use his data
and regress log aggregate hours on log (1-tax rate) and get an elasticity
of 0.7. Among the other macro studies, Davies and Henrekson (2004)
regress aggregate hours, divided by the population aged 15–64, on a
tax wedge variable (the sum of tax rates on income, payrolls and con-
sumption), with or without including country ﬁxed effects. Their pre-
ferred estimate implies that the macro elasticity of working hours
with respect to the net-of-tax rate is approximately 0.33 in a model
without country ﬁxed effects, with the bulk of the response arising
from the intensive margin.31 In a model with country dummies, the
same elasticity is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Alesina et al. (2005) also include variables capturing unionisation
and labour regulation in addition to a tax variable (from the OECD Tax-
ingWages). Their estimates imply elasticities that are close to those ob-
tained by Davies and Henrekson (2004) in a cross section without
country dummies and with no covariates (Table 1.8), but when unioni-
sation is added to the model, both the tax variable and unionisation are
insigniﬁcant (Table 1.10). In amodelwith country and yearﬁxed effects,
union density and an employment protection measure enter with neg-
ative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, whereas the tax variable is not signif-
icant (Table 1.9).
We run similar regressions for the same countries included in our
macro data. We present models both with and without country and
year ﬁxed effects. The source for the country-level data is McDaniel
(2012). The number of observations is somewhat smaller in this com-
parison analysis. The reason is that the observations for Israel are miss-
ing in the aggregate macro-level tax data.31 This elasticity follows from the slope estimate of −9.5 reported by Davies and
Henrekson (2004), Table 3, upper panel, sample D and the summary statistics in Table 1.Macro-level estimates of the elasticity of aggregate working hours
with respect to net of tax rate of the macro tax wedge, presented in
Table 8, indicate that the elasticity is positive and signiﬁcant without
country and year ﬁxed effects in both the total sample (0.22) and in
the hours sample (0.26). These elasticities are reasonably similar in
magnitude to those reported by Davies and Henrekson (2004) and
Alesina et al. (2005). As was to be expected from these earlier studies,
the coefﬁcient for the tax wedge ceases to be statistically signiﬁcant
when country and time ﬁxed effects are added to the regression equa-
tion. This suggests that the macro approach also does not produce elas-
ticities which would be an order of magnitude greater than typical
micro elasticities are.
Note ﬁnally that the tax variable in macro studies is typically
based on average tax rates, although Prescott multiplies income
taxes by a factor of 1.6 (which is the ratio of marginal taxes to average
taxes in the U.S.). When examining the correlation between the
average tax rate in the McDaniel data and the country mean
statutory marginal tax rate, calculated by us, it turns out that the
correlation is around 0.7. The correlation between the macro average
tax rate and our measure of the effective marginal tax rate is actually
larger at 0.8.
6. Conclusions
Much of the microeconometric evidence on the impacts of taxes on
labour supply builds on reliable identiﬁcation in principle, but the tax
variation is often quite limited and the comparison groups can also be
affected by tax changes via general equilibrium effects. In the macro
work, by contrast, identiﬁcation is blurred by other confounding fac-
tors – taxation is only one possible reason why aggregate hours differ.
On the other hand, cross-country tax differences are typically larger
then changes within countries and they can therefore potentially pick
up the drivers of long-term steady-state differences in working hours
across countries.
This paper attempts to build bridges between these two polar ap-
proaches by estimating, using the same micro data from many coun-
tries, micro, macro and intermediate (micro–macro) estimates of
labour supply, including both the intensive and extensive margins.
The main aim is to examine whether it is indeed the case that the
macro-level estimates of labour supply are greater than micro esti-
mates, as interesting and somewhat provocative recent research has
suggested. In our macro-level analysis, the variables are aggregated
from the theoretically correct micro concepts and we thus use effective
marginal tax rates, virtual incomes and participation tax rates both at
the micro and the macro level. To our knowledge, our paper is the




A. All B. Men C. Women
Australia Australia Australia
Financial gain from work −0.110 Financial gain from work −0.098 Financial gain from work −0.002
(0.091) (0.122) (0.174)
Nr of cells 44 Nr of cells 23 Nr of cells 21
Belgium Belgium Belgium
Financial gain from work 0.011 Financial gain from work 0.426*** Financial gain from work 0.002
(0.146) (0.164) (0.041)
Nr of cells 44 Nr of cells 24 Nr of cells 20
Canada Canada Canada
Financial gain from work 0.021 Financial gain from work 0.013 Financial gain from work 0.105*
(0.018) (0.022) (0.063)
Nr of cells 189 Nr of cells 96 Nr of cells 93
Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic
Financial gain from work 0.013 Financial gain from work 0.199** Financial gain from work −0.042
(0.115) (0.099) (0.218)
Nr of cells 47 Nr of cells 24 Nr of cells 23
Denmark Denmark Denmark
Financial gain from work 0.121* Financial gain from work 0.100** Financial gain from work 0.161
(0.062) (0.041) (0.120)
Nr of cells 120 Nr of cells 60 Nr of cells 60
Finland Finland Finland
Financial gain from work 0.171*** Financial gain from work 0.173* Financial gain from work 0.163**
0.062 0.101 0.072
Nr of cells 120 Nr of cells 60 Nr of cells 60
Germany Germany Germany
Financial gain from work −0.106 Financial gain from work 0.092* Financial gain from work 0.074
(0.085) (0.053) (0.130)
Nr of cells 117 Nr of cells 60 Nr of cells 57
Israel Israel Israel
Financial gain from work 0.165*** Financial gain from work 0.134** Financial gain from work 0.174***
(0.039) (0.059) (0.049)
Nr of cells 96 Nr of cells 48 Nr of cells 48
Norway Norway Norway
Financial gain from work −0.044* Financial gain from work −0.072 Financial gain from work −0.035
(0.027) (0.059) (0.032)
Nr of cells 120 Nr of cells 60.000 Nr of cells 60
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Financial gain from work −0.067 Financial gain from work 0.193* Financial gain from work 0.233
(0.148) (0.101) (0.297)
Nr of cells 63 Nr of cells 33 Nr of cells 30
Sweden Sweden Sweden
Financial gain from work 0.011 Financial gain from work 0.039 Financial gain from work −0.007
(0.052) (0.056) (0.083)
Nr of cells 96 Nr of cells 48 Nr of cells 48
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom
Financial gain from work −0.026 Financial gain from work −0.032 Financial gain from work 0.018
(0.020) (0.021) (0.051)
Nr of cells 91 Nr of cells 46 Nr of cells 45
United States United States United States
Financial gain from work −0.018 Financial gain from work −0.010 Financial gain from work −0.124
(0.016) (0.021) (0.122)
Nr of cells 168 Nr of cells 84 Nr of cells 84
Note:Dependent variable: probability being inpaid employment. All regressions contain cell dummies and year dummies. Cells are deﬁned based on age, education and sex. Cells with less
than 50 observations are excluded. The reported estimates are the elasticities of employment rate with respect to the difference in disposable incomewhenworking and when not work-
ing. Standard errors reported below the estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** at 1% level.
97M. Jäntti et al. / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 87–99We believe that examining cross-countrymicro data is of crucial im-
portance; at the same time, there are also caveats associated with the
approach. For example, the tax and beneﬁt modelling is necessarilyTable 6
Participation macro regressions.
(1) All (2) All (3) All
Financial gain 0.104*** 0.076* 0.179***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.036)
N 56 56 56
Year dummies No Yes No
Country dummies No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable: probability of being in paid employment. The reported estimates a
when working and when not working. Standard errors reported below the estimates are robusmore crude than in a single-country study, leading to possible mea-
surement errors. Note that our estimates capture important life cycle
aspects (the retirement margin) and at least some part of dynamic(4) All (5) Hour sample (6) Men (7) Women
0.020 0.024 0.009 0.135
(0.075) (0.075) (0.043) (0.118)
56 26 56 56
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
re the elasticities of employment rate with respect to the difference in disposable income
t to heteroscedasticity. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** at 1% level.
Table 7
Participation micro–macro regressions.
(1) All (2) All (3) All (4) Hours sample (5) All (6) Men (7) Women
Financial gain from work 0.203*** 0.012 0.031*** 0.007 0.012 0.023*** 0.124***
(0.021) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.030)
Nr of cells 1218 1218 1218 612 1218 617 601
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household type No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear education trend No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*country No No No No Yes No No
Note: Dependent variable: probability of being in paid employment. The reported estimates are the elasticities of employment rate with respect to the difference in disposable income
when working and when not working. Cells are deﬁned based on age, education, sex and country. Cells with less than 50 observations are excluded. Standard errors reported below
the estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** at 1% level.
98 M. Jäntti et al. / Journal of Public Economics 127 (2015) 87–99learning-by-doing elements (when we estimate models at the
macro level without country dummies); both of these effects have
been suggested as possible reasons whymacro estimates could be size-
able. While we have examined the robustness of many of the results,
there is clearly a need to interpret the exact magnitude of the results
cautiously.
With these caveats inmind, it can be said that the results do not pro-
vide strong support for the view that macro estimates would be higher
than micro estimates. While our macro-level estimates are close to
micro estimates, the hours estimate at the macro level is in fact some-
what higher than the corresponding micro one. This does not appear
to be the case for the extensive margin, and therefore our results are
in line with the argument in Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2012), ac-
cording to which the difference in macro versus micro estimates would
be greater for the intensive margin than the extensive margin. The
upper limit of the conﬁdence interval of both participation and hour
elasticities is below one in our study, suggesting that very high macro
estimates, of the order of 1 to 2, are unlikely. For the Nordic countries,
the results suggest that maintaining high tax rates does not necessarily
rule out high employment rates, provided that other relevant policies
are well designed.
Acknowledgement
We are grateful to the editor (Kalle Moene) and the two anony-
mous referees and the numerous seminar participants at the
Conference on the Economics of the Nordic Model (Oslo) and else-
where for their useful comments. Allan Seuri provided excellent
research assistance. Financial support from the Yrjö Jahnsson
Foundation, the Finnish Employees' Foundation and the Jan
Wallander's and Tom Hedelius' Research Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.12.006.Table 8
Macro regressions with average tax rates.
Total sample Total sample Hours sample Hours sample
Net of tax wedge 0.221*** 0.681 0.263** 0.914
(0.064) (0.551) (0.124) (1.011)
Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Country dummies No Yes No Yes
N 52 52 26 26
Note: The dependent variable is working hours per adult population. The reported esti-
mates are elasticities with respect to 1-average tax wedge, where tax wedge is equal to
1-(labour income tax rate)/[(1 + consumption tax rate)*(1 + payroll tax rate)]. Robust
standard errors used. Both the dependent and independent variables are from McDaniel
(2012). * indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** at 1% level.References
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